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Shannon: Human Cloning: Religious and Ethical Issues

HUMAN CLONING: EXAMINING
RELIGIOUS AND ETHICAL ISSUES
THOMAS A. SHANNON*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Undoubtedly, the eventual mapping of the human genome will be a boon
to science, medicine, and anthropology, among other disciplines. This map will
provide a clearer lens with which to examine the question of what "being
human" means, will direct us where to look for anomalies that cause disease,
and will greatly assist in correcting those errors. We are genuinely on the edge
of a new revolution in medicine, one that will provide access to the very
structure of our nature. We can literally reach inside ourselves, remove genes,
and either correct or replace them. Such power, though truly awe-inspiring, is
also truly frightening.
Yet these achievements bring risk as well. Some fear that the new genetics
will inspire a new eugenics and that the Human Genome Project will set a
genetic standard by which all humans are measured and evaluated. Again, the
individual seems to be in danger of being subordinated to the "type."
Additionally, new developments in behavioral genetics are building up
suggestive evidence for the role genes play in all manners of human behavior,
from sexual preference to choices of political perspectives and marriage
partners. In learning more of what it means to be "human," will we become
less human in the process?
The embryo division experiment by Dr. Jerry N. Hall and Dr. Robert
Stillman' of Washington University and the brief, but lively, discussion that
followed it once again focused on many of the thematic issues raised by ethical,
scientific, religious, and cultural debates over genetic engineering: human
power over nature, intellectual arrogance, the technological imperative, action
before thought, the degradation of human beings, and the violation of their
unique genetic structure. Yet, the experiment also offered the promise of
. Ph.D., Boston University, 1972; Professor of Religion and Social Ethics, Worchester
Polytechnic Institute. Some of the ideas developed in this article are based on material in Chapter
8 of the author's forthcoming book MADE IN WHOSE IMAGE? GENETIC ENGINEERING AND
CHRISTIAN ETHICS (1998) and are used with the permission of the publisher.
1. Hall and Stillman technically did not engage in cloning but rather embryo division in which
they used an electrical current to cause undifferentiated cells in an embryo to divide and make more
embryos for use in assisted reproduction. The method is commonly used with cattle but had not
been done with humans.
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benefits: advanced knowledge of the developmental process of pre-implantation
embryos and the further development of new responses to infertility. Even
though the university research ethics committee cleared this experiment, Hall
and Stillman have retired from the embryo division business, at least for the
present. Public and professional reaction seemed to be quite strong against such
embryo division.
The most recent chapter of the genetics debate was written by Dr. Ian
Wilmut of Scotland when, on February 22, 1997, he announced that he had
successfully cloned a lamb which he named "Dolly." This was the first
successful application of cloning, or nuclear transfer technology, in a mammal.
More significantly, the nucleus of the cell that produced Dolly came from a sixyear- old ewe, thus showing that scientists may "turn on" genetic instructions
that were previously thought to be irreversibly "turned off."2
Every cell of one's body contains all the genetic information needed to
make a whole other being. Very early in embryonic development, however, this
information is selectively "turned off," and various cells become committed to
becoming specific body parts through a process called restriction. The
technological breakthrough of Dolly is that Dr. Wilmut succeeded, after 277
attempts, to have the DNA from a six year old cell "turn on" and be the source
of the genetic information that eventually led to the development of Dolly.
After the nuclear transfer was completed, an electrical charge was applied to the
fused cell so that its contents would emerge from the nucleus and the process of
cell division would begin. Two elements in this process are critical: (1) the
DNA that had been "turned off" was "turned on" again, and (2) the cell was six
years old which showed that the restriction process could be reversed even in
adult cells.
This experiment has set off yet another massive international debate on
bioethical issues. In this Article, I will review several religious and ethical
perspectives in the cloning debate and conclude by arguing for an extremely
narrowly drawn case favoring some forms of cloning, while rejecting others.
II. THE CULTURAL PRESENTATION OF CLONING

In this Section, I wish to present some elements of the cultural context in
which cloning was presented. This Section will also introduce elements of the
cloning debate that later Sections will develop.

2. Ian Wilmut et al., Viable Offspring Derived from Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells, 385
NATURE 810-13 (1997).
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A. Presentations in the Media
Because genetics, whether medical, agricultural, or animal, is big business,
many stories on Dolly's unique origin were reported in the economics section
of newspapers. 3 That is not unusual now, for news of genetic developments
have regularly been reported in that section of newspapers ever since gene
companies went public over a decade ago. Some of this reporting vascilated
between praise for the technology and concern about whether ethical criticisms
might depress the growing biotechnical market. While on the one hand biotech
leaders affirmed the immorality of cloning a full human, they were also
concerned that such ethical tut-tuting not go too far lest this rapidly growing
industry be harmed, particularly in its agricultural and animal applications where
Thus, Dolly has raised the
cloning techniques are routinely used.
time
major financial interests of the
but
this
science/business-ethics debate again,
debates, are mediating the
in
such
biotechnical-industrial complex, new players
debate.
Another interesting dimension appearing in the science section of
newspapers was the reported comments of some senior American scientists who
dismissed the significance of the research by suggesting that one could not write
a grant proposal to clone a sheep because the scientific question was unclear.
Another suggested that the project was mundane and merely technological.' Is
this professional jealousy? Remember that the UK is now two up on American
science: Patrick Steptoe and Robert Edwards had the first in vitro fertilization
(IVF) baby, and now Wilmut has the first cloned mammal. While it is true that
scientists are motivated by the quest for knowledge, they are also motivated by
the quests for patents and the financial rewards that come from them. So perhaps
it was no accident that a few days after the announcement of Dolly's creation,
American scientists announced that they had cloned two rhesus monkeys, though
they used embryonic cells, not the more difficult older adult cells that were
Dolly's progenitor. The cloning sweepstakes are wide open.
A final note about cloning appeared in the entertainment section which
discussed various cloning movies.5 Of note was the split between comedy and
science fiction terror stories. While Multiplicity did not do well at the box

3. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Fisher, Success in Cloning Hardly Insures Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
25, 1997, at D1.
4. Gina Kolata reported these comments and others like them. See Gina Kolata, Workaday
World of Stock Breeding Clones Blockbuster, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1997, at C1 and C8. Part of
the tension is between the uses of genetic technologies to solve practical problems versus basic
research, as well as the tension between those who work with animal genes and those who work with
human genes.
5. See, e.g., Caryn James, A Warning as Science Catches up on Cloning, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
26, 1997, at C9.
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office, it did show some practical applications of the technology to help resolve
domestic complications. It also observed, though, that sometimes when one
makes a copy, the second one is not quite as sharp as the first. Twins showed
the comic possibilities by presenting identical twins who were not quite identical.
This was blamed on making one twin from leftover DNA, what is technically
referred to as "junk DNA," the sections of DNA whose function we do not
Jurassic Park told the familiar morality tale of the evils of
know.
commercialization of technology. The movie ended with everyone but the
.mad" scientist living happily every after, but much material remained to clone
a sequel which of course is now available. The more recent offering, Gattaca,
explores difficulties of an individual who does not meet the genetic standards of
the "perfect society." This movie was preceded by an advertisement campaign
which resembled advertisements for genetic clinics which would provide a baby
with the characteristics chosen by the parents. Only when one looked at the
very fine print at the bottom of the full page advertisements, did one realize that
this was science-fiction, not science.
B. Presentationsof the Cloning Debate
What I term "ethics hysteria" has dominated much media coverage. This
.ethics hysteria" takes the worst possible ethical and most technically
improbable scenario and builds the case for rejecting cloning on that basis.
Probably the best single example of such an hysterical presentation of cloning
was the February 10, 1997, cover of Der Spiegel, the German equivalent of
Time. Marching down the cover were multiple copies of Adolf Hitler, Albert
Einstein, and Claudia Schiffer. While not all of the figures may represent
everyone's worst case scenarios, the technology of cloning is presented as
replicating an infinite series of beings who are not only genetically identical, but
more importantly are multiple copies of the very same person.
This scenario raises another dimension of the cultural presentation of the
cloning debate: genetic reductionism. This position argues what the cover of
Der Spiegel presented graphically: by simply replicating my genetic code, I am
thereby replicated. However, cloning does create an offspring that is genetically
identical to the donor of the DNA. But what follows from that? What follows
is genetic identity: the clone is genetically identical to its source. It may even
look identical. The hidden premise of genetic reductionism is that all that I need
to make me "me" is my genetic profile. Such an argument ignores the fact that
the clones are two distinct individuals and have their own distinct environment
in which they are raised, to say nothing of ignoring any transcendent or personal
dimension of the human. Thus, the clone and the donor quickly begin to part
ways.
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To understand this better, consider human identical- twins, who are in fact
clones of nature. The fertilized egg divides, resulting in two distinct individuals
with identical genetic profiles. We know that many studies on identical twins
have shown that they share many interests and similarities, even when raised
apart in radically different environments. Perhaps these studies are what drive
the fantasy that creating clones of Michael Jackson or Michael Jordan would
create beings with exactly the same abilities and interests present, perhaps even
at the virginal conception. 6
Although our genetic heritage strongly influences us, environment shapes
our lives too. Suppose Michael Jordan's clone were raised in an environment
or culture in which the main and perhaps preferred career option for African
Americans was not professional sports. Would a genetic determinism be at
work that would impel him to play basketball no matter what? This seems to
be the great flaw in the cloning debate: genetics will win out no matter what.
This is simply not true. Nonetheless, genetic determinism is paradoxically both
the assumption of the outcome of cloning, as well as the major argument against
human cloning.
What this brief survey reveals is that various agendas are at work in the
cloning debate: economic, cultural, scientific, and political. We have no
canonical presentation or analysis of cloning nor can its discussion be cleanly
extracted from a variety of cultural perspectives. But this overview directs us
to look at and attend to certain issues as we seek to evaluate this stunning
development in genetics.
III.

RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES

I begin with a consideration of some religious perspectives because often
religion is perceived as the great "Nay Sayer," the enemy of science, and the
protector of the status quo, preferably the one of several centuries ago. While
I disagree with such stereotypes, some religious themes do tend to be less
supportive of interventions into creation or human life. In this Section, I wish
to discuss two religious themes-"humans playing God" and "humans created
in the image of God"-and to show traditional usages of these terms, as well as
other ways to interpret these themes that allow some leeway in their
interpretation.

6. One of the other interesting things about cloning, of course, is that no males are needed.
The nucleus of the egg is removed, and the nucleus of another cell-from a female-is inserted. If
the scientists and technicians involved are female, reproduction occurs without the need of a male.
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A. Two TraditionalReligious Themes
1. Humans Playing God
We often use the term "playing God" as a way of arguing that humans have
overstepped their boundaries. This term suggests that a clear demarcation exists
between the roles of God and humans and that there are areas of life where God
rules, where God is in charge, and where humans ought not enter. The term
evokes an omnipotent God who is the Creator of all and who commands all.
The term also evokes the image of God as "God of the Gaps," that is, the God
who is invoked when all else fails, or when we have exceed our limits, our
knowledge is at an end, and our powers frustrated. Thus, it is most clearly in
the gaps that God rules, and it is in the gaps that God's power is most clearly
evoked. Here, God reigns supreme, and, here, we cannot play God.
Of course, as knowledge increases, the gaps grow smaller and smaller, and
as a result, God's reign shrinks; God's power becomes lessened; and God
becomes less necessary. Then humans step into the recently vacated gaps and
play God by exercising the powers in the gaps previously thought only God's.
Cloning surely symbolizes such a disappearance of a gap and an exercise of new
powers.
Such a vision of human intervention into nature is hardly Christian. It is
certainly much more Greek, much more resonant with the myth of Prometheus,
who in stealing fire from the Gods and giving it to humans became like the Gods
and thus played God. However, he suffered the fate of one who usurped the
power of the Gods. 7 Were this God, who is suggested by this version of
playing God, actually this fearful of sharing creation, assumedly God would
never have created in the first place. Why spoil the way things are!
Perhaps a better rendering of playing God is to learn as much about God
as one can and then to play God by acting as God acts.8 Minimally this might
mean that we are to be creative as well as generous in our creativity and to keep
covenant with our God and our creations. To affirm this is to surrender full
control because we are not God. But it is also to assert a profound relation
between ourselves and the rest of created reality. We play God by imitating
God-no small task.

7. For his deed, Prometheus was chained by Zeus to Mt. Caucasus. Each day an eagle came
and tore at his liver, and each night the liver regenerated. This lasted for many thousands of years
until he was released from this torment by Hercules.
8. In this section, I follow several ideas suggested by Allen D. Verhey. See Allen D. Verhey,
'Playing God' and Invoking a Perspective, 20 J. MED. PHIL. 347-64 (1995).
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Two immediate consequences follow from this. First, this image of playing
God does not set up a kind of competition between God and humans. The
theme is stripped of its traditional mythological overtones and given a chance to
return to a version much more faithful to the Judeo-Christian tradition. Second,
in principle, such an understanding of playing God does not prohibit
interventions in created reality. The moral element here would focus on that
kind of intervention. A more helpful hermaneutic for understanding the term
"playing God" might in fact be genuine play-and the nuance here is that play
cannot be purely instrumental, for then it is no longer play, but work. And
although the book of Genesis describes creation as a labor from which God
rested9 and the book of Job presents creation as a kind of civil engineering
project,' ° the book of Wisdom describes creation as a form of play."
2. Humans Created in the Image of God
A second religious theme is that of the human created in the image of God.
A traditional understanding of this theme is that of humans as stewards who
conserve and protect what God has created. Typically one does this by
respecting both the design of creation and the limits which God has placed on
both the orders of biological nature and human society. Because this God
designed the universe according to a plan and indeed embedded this plan into
nature, the responsibility of a steward is to remain faithful to this plan and
conserve it.
Such an interpretation of the image of God in human beings is a
conservative one which, while not totally opposed to all interventions, is focused
more on recognizing limits and maintaining boundaries. This is not done
because of a lack of Promethian hubris, but rather out of a sense of genuine
humility, a recognition of one's place before God and a sense of how one is to
live out one's vocation in the world.
But another understanding of the image of God in man is one suggested by
Philip Hefner: the created co-creator.z This phrase is important on two
levels. First, it identifies humans as created. That is, because we are created,
we are dependent on God for our present and continued existence, and we are
not God's equals as creators. But, second, we are co-creators. We become
participants with God in the continuous evolving of both nature and history. We
have a responsibility both for the development of each and for our neighbors as

9. Genesis 1:1-2:3.
10. Job 38:1-38.
11. Proverbs 8:30-31.
12. See Philip Hefner, The Evolution ofthe Created Co-Creator, inCOSMOS AS CREATION 21134 (Ted Peters ed., 1988).
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we seek to further the divine work of creation. Such a view clearly allows a
much expanded view of human intervention into the world. As evolving, the
world is a work in progress, and its fulfillment is partially dependent on our
interacting with it through the creative use of our freedom.
B. Variations on These Two Themes
I would argue that a better reading of both the terms "playing God" and
"humans created in the image of God" is that of created co-creators who,
enjoined with the task of playing God, do so by helping to bring creation to its
final fulfillment. Such a vision of God and one's relation to God suggests,
however, some cautionary notes. This vision of creation is not one of
instrumentality or control, two values highly prized in technology and our
culture. Should the context of discussions about cloning reveal a tendency to
such values, I think one could mount a strong religious critique against cloning
because of the problematic nature of such values in human life. Let me
illustrate this through an analogous case.
Several years ago a man underwent a reversal of his vasectomy so he and
his wife could conceive a child in the hope that she might serve as a source of
blood marrow for their older daughter who was dying of cancer. The reversal
was successful, and he and his wife conceived a child. The infant's blood
marrow was compatible, and at age eighteen months, blood marrow was
transferred from her to her sister. The therapy was successful, and both are
living very happy lives. Although the parents most strongly argued that they did
not see their newborn as a source of parts and although this case clearly does
not involve cloning, I cannot help but think that it is an example of creating one
human being to serve another's needs, clearly one of the more prominent
cloning scenarios. What bothers me about this case and my extrapolation of it
to cloning is that the majority of citizens either agreed with the family's
decisions or argued that it was the family's right to do as it pleased. This says
to me that our society already has a mindset or cultural disposition to accept one
of the most frequently mentioned scenarios in cloning: replacement parts.
Another dimension of this same problem was recently reported in the New
York Times. The story reports that doctors at Columbia-Presbyterian Medical
Center in Manhattan mixed sperm and eggs to make various embryos with
different backgrounds: "The idea was to allow prospective parents to select
embryos whose parents resemble them physically or have the same ethnic
background and are well educated-the best possible sperm and egg donors for
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those who cannot have babies of their own."" 3 The cost is $2750. Many of
these embryos are made with left over eggs from IVF or eggs obtained from
donors when the planned recipient changes her mind. The eggs are fertilized
with sperm from commercial banks selected for particular characteristics. Such
a practice is certainly another direction in the mechanization of reproduction and
the commodification of human body parts and human embryos. And selection
of embryos is based on desired characteristics, which brings us another step
closer to the objectification of humans through their being valued for their
function or for their value in a market. Again, such a mind-set helps create a
cloning mentality.
Many current arguments for human cloning all revolve around some sort
of use of human clones for the benefit of the cloner (for want of a better term).
Thus, the scenarios we hear of are clones as sources for spare parts, specialized
social or work functions-usually the menial ones we do not wish to do-and
vanity reasons-one of a good thing is never enough. Common to all of these
arguments is the reduction of humans to means only, a rejection of the dignity
of both cloner and the clone, and essentially a commodification of the human
clones. Thus, in these discussions, a certain instrumental mentality is at work.
While perhaps born of desperation or extreme need, the mindset is, nonetheless,
instrumental. The concepts of playing God and acting as a created co-creator
do not, in my judgment, sit well with this mentality. Here, we have control and
use, not freedom and appreciation.
IV.

THE ETHICAL DEBATE OVER CLONING

In the debate over human cloning, a distinction must be made between full
human cloning-research directed to produce an adult clone-and research on
cloning up to, but not including, implantation in a uterus. The distinction is
important because of two elements.
First, research on the human preimplantation embryo could be important for learning about embryonic
development or about the reproductive process. Second, different moral claims
can be made about the pre-implantation embryo and the individuated human
embryo.
A.

Cloning and the Pre-implantationEmbryo

One of the claims about cloning is that it violates individuality or the
individual's right to a unique genetic identity. First, it is important to
distinguish between genetic uniqueness and individuality. A pre-implantation

13. Gina Kolata, ClinicsSelling Enbryos Made for 'Adoption,' N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1997,
at Al.
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embryo is genetically unique in that it is a new combination of the genes from
the mother and father. But it is more precise to say that this pre-implantation
embryo represents the next genetic generation precisely because it has not yet
reached the developmental stage of reduction in which the cells become
irreversibly committed to forming specific body parts in a particular body. Or,
to say this more technically, there is as yet no differential gene expression. I
argue that the pre-implantation embryo presents itself as the biological equivalent
of what the Medieval philosopher Duns Scotus called, in philosophical terms,
the common nature. Because the cells of the pre-implantation embryo have the
capacity of totipotency-the ability to become any part of the body-they are
most properly designated as representing what is common to humanity. 4 The
genetic structure they possess is generic to the species but is not yet identified
with a particular individual, thus the term common nature. Though the cells of
the pre-implantation embryo possess a biological and teleological unity that will
eventuate into a single human being, until these cells lose the capacity for
totipotency through the process of restriction and become differentially
expressed, we do not have what Norman Ford has called an "ontological
individual." "5 Such individuality is biological in that the whole organism can
no longer be divided into parts, each of which could become another organism
as was the case before restriction. Such individuality is also philosophical in
that this being is a single being with the potential to become a moral agent, an
individual responsible for his or her own acts.
Given what we know about embryogenesis, a more precise way to describe
this being at this stage is either the establishment of the next genetic generation
or the establishment of the common nature. That is, while it is correct that the
pre-implantation embryo contains the appropriate genetic information for that
organism's development, that genetic information is not necessarily associated
with a specific individual and cannot, therefore, claim moral privilege through
such an association. The genetic uniqueness is associated with what is common
to all-human nature-not a particular individual because such an entity does not
yet exist. The claim of the moral relevance of individuality is appropriately
made of the pre-implantation embryo only after the process of restriction has
occurred, that is, after we have the only individual who in fact will emerge from
the constriction of the common nature to this particular individual. This is the
individual, all things being equal, who will become the agent of acts. Thus,
while the fact that the pre-implantation embryo manifests the human genome is
morally relevant, it does not have the same moral relevance as individuality
because the genetic status is associated with what is common to all, not what is

14. For a more thorough development of this, see Thomas A. Shannon, Cloning, Uniqueness,
and Individuality, 19 LOUVAIN STUD. 283-306 (1994).

15. See generally NORMAN M.

FORD, WHEN DID I BEGIN?

INDIVIDUAL IN HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, AND SCIENCE (1988).
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unique to a person. The fact that the individual who emerges from this process
may factually be the only one with this genotype also is of less moral relevance
because we know, through Dolly, that such a genotype is in principle replicable.
The focus of moral attention must be, in my judgment, on the individual
manifested through this genotype, not the genotype itself.
What then are we to think of research on the pre-implantation embryo
either by dividing its cells or by nuclear transplantation? First, let us examine
the dividing of the cells of the pre-implantation embryo into separate entities.
What one has with the pre-implantation embryo is a teleologically united cluster
of cells that has the capacity to become a distinct or ontological individual. The
pre-implantation embryo is neither all of humanity nor a particular human, but
is the common nature out of which a particular, individual human can develop.
Therefore, to divide the 4, 8, or 16 cells of the pre-implantation embryo
into separate cells is not, in the memorably inaccurate phrasing of Germain
Grisez, "splitting themselves in half." 16 Rather, it is to divide the whole
organism into parts that themselves can become wholes. To do so is not to
divide an ontological individual nor to violate that entity's distinct individuality.
Although the pre-implantation embryo is alive, carries the human genetic code,
is genetically and physically distinct from its mother and father, and represents
the next genetic generation, nonetheless such physical features of the preimplantation embryo do not constitute the philosophical basis for a claim of
absolute value for this entity because there is as yet no subject or person on
whose behalf to make the claim. In other words, no individual exists.
Second, let us consider cloning, that is, nuclear transplantation. Whole
organism cloning, as distinct from gene and cell cloning, takes the nucleus of
an adult cell and puts it in the enucleated cell of another organism. The purpose
is to genetically replicate the adult organism from which the nucleus came. The
key to cloning is that, while each adult cell contains all the DNA necessary for
the development of an entire organism, not all of that DNA is expressed. Such
differential gene expression makes possible the development of the individual
body parts and organs. The technical key to the success of cloning is to
discover whether these unexpressed genes in the adult cell can be "turned on"
and produce a genetically identical organism.
The common argument agaifist cloning is that it violates the genetic
uniqueness of the pre-implantation embryo. This claim of moral standing based
on genetic uniqueness in the pre-implantation embryo cannot be sustained, for

16. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Cloning: Where Do We Draw the Line?, TIME, Nov. 8, 1993, at 64,
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there is no subject of whom the claim can be made, as previously argued.
Additionally, even if the cloning of humans were to succeed, what is replicated
is the genetic structure, not the individual. No one claims that genetically
identical twins violate each other's right to genetic individuality by virtue of
bearing the same genetic structure. This is because, I argue, the more critical
moral claim is that of individuality which is biologically secured only after
restriction. Genetic uniqueness and its relation to identity is important for
questions of lineage, but it is not the totality or even the basis of individuality.
How might one evaluate the morality of acts performed upon the preimplantation embryo whether obtained by division of the pre-implantation
embryo or cloning? I suggest an examination of the object, the intention, and
the circumstances of the act (particularly the circumstances of the end, the way
the act is performed, the likely success of the act, and the circumstance of
7
place). '
With respect to the object, i.e., the pre-implantation embryos, these entities
have a pre-moral value in that they are living, bear the human genome, and have
a teleology directed to the moral category of personhood. However, because no
individual subject exists of whom a claim can be made, no violation of
individuality or personhood occurs. This pre-moral value must be judged in the
light of other pre-moral and moral goods such as the benefits to come from
research on these entities and the good of assisting in reproduction. I conclude
that such goods-for example, experiments to discover the mechanisms to turn
unexpressed genes on, and to study early embryonic development, or other
studies to help enhance fertilization-could outweigh the claims of protection of
the pre-implantation embryo and that research, whether by division of the cells
of the pre-implantation embryo or cloning, could be done on the human preimplantation embryo prior to the process of restriction.
Considerations of the likely success of the act of cloning are difficult to
calculate, for one genuinely does not know the full outcome or range of
consequences that may follow the first experiment. This suggests that one very
carefully consider the intentions as well as the purpose at which one aims. If
the purpose of the cloning is to learn more of early cell development to aid in
IVF, one could accept a lower level of success because the purpose is narrow
and focused on internal development of the cells. Experiments attempting to
"turn on" unexpressed genes could also be justified even though the lack of
success may be low. The end of the experiment is focused on internal
mechanisms of the gene.
Further experiments that seek to apply such

17. Here I am explicitly using the ethics method of John Duns Scotus. For a fuller account,
see Thomas A. Shannon, Method in Ethics: A Scotistic Contribution, 53 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 27293 (1993).
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knowledge, however, would have to be very carefully examined in light of the
end and intention.
I would interpret the circumstance of place to address the question of the
priority of such research in relation to other needs in health care. Because such
research is so expensive and applicable to only a narrow range of cases, a strong
argument can be made against such research. If one broadens the argument to
understanding the mechanisms of gene expression, then the range of application
may be much broader-e.g., a better understanding of the immune system-and
a different moral argument can be made. What is important is that the criterion
of the circumstance of place makes us look to the setting of the research and its
location in the full range of health care services as an appropriate source for
moral evaluation of the research we wish to undertake. Such a criterion would,
I think, assign a lower priority to cloning.
Thus, given an extremely careful consideration of both the moral status of
the pre-implantation embryo and the significance of the research involved, an
argument can be made to justify such research up to the time when the process
of restriction would occur, approximately two weeks after fertilization. Up to
this time, the pre-implantation embryo does not have the claim of true
individuality and thus would lack the full moral protection associated with
personhood which cannot occur at least until such individuality is established.
The moral argument justifying such research is, in my judgment, a very narrow
one and one that must be examined on a case by case basis and surrounded by
appropriate safeguards to prevent unwarranted extensions.
Individuality takes moral precedence over genetic uniqueness and is the key
to the ethical analysis of research on the pre-implantation embryo. Though I am
factually the only one who bears my genetic profile, my genetic profile is not
in principle unique to me. Genetic identity can be replicated either in vivo,
through a natural cleavage of the pre-implantation embryo into genetically
identical twins, or in vitro, either through division of the cells of the preimplantation embryo or through organismic cloning (now done in a sheep and
two rhesus monkeys). My genome is significant because it constitutes the
establishment of my bodyliness, my human nature, and gives the basis for
tracing my lineage. But more significant is my individuality both in the sense
of indivisibleness and in the sense of the subject of moral acts. For it is only that
"I" who cannot be divided into parts, who can personalize that genetic structure,
and who can transcend that genetic structure through personal acts. The absence
of such individuality in the pre-implantation embryo is a key element in the
justification of the lack of its absolute protection as well as the possibility of
some research just as the presence of such individuality is a significant feature
of its moral evaluation and is the basis of the prohibition of other types of
research.
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B. Cloning Scenarios
1. Replacements
One scenario commonly discussed is replacing a child who died or
generating replacement parts through cloning one's identical twin. While this
cannot technically be done at this stage, such discussions raise profound
religious and philosophical issues of human dignity. What do such discussions
say of the status of the clone? Has not this being simply been reduced to a
means to an end? Has not this being's essential humanity been dismissed by
reduction to the status of "replacement"? Such replacement talk avoids the fact
that such entities are living beings with the human genotype while
simultaneously reducing such beings to objects or commodities. The problem
is that such talk assumes that "we" are not "they," though both are genetically
identical. But such an assumption is wrong precisely because it is the "we-ness"
of our genes in the "they-ness" of their genes that we desire. How else could
"they" be replacements for "us" if "they" are not genetically identical to "us"?
To reduce such beings to commodities is to do the same to ourselves.
Communality of genetic identity suggests communality of dignity as well as
communality of fate. Or to quote John Donne: "Never send to know for whom
the bell tolls; it tolls for thee." 18
This practice of cloning either does not stop to consider or simply rejects
the humanity, individuality, and personhood of the clone. A clone of a human
is a human and will be a person as I am-not the same person, but his or her
own person. I do not know what others would call such an entity, but I would
have to call it a person-at least after it has passed through some developmental
markers such as the ones suggested in the preceding Section. And the clone
would certainly have to pass through many major developmental markers either
to be a full replacement or to be an organ source. But why would my clone not
be me, a me with whom I can do what I want, assuming that, because it is my
body, I can do with it as I please?
Personhood is not identical with the genome of either the fertilized egg or
the clone. I would call this position genetic reductionism: the reduction of the
person to his or her genetic structure only. That is, to identify the person with
the genetic structure is to say that we are our genes only. Were this position
correct, the clone would in fact be me, that is the identical person I am.

18. John Donne, Meditation XVII, in DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS 107, 109
(1624).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol32/iss2/18

Shannon: Human Cloning: Religious and Ethical Issues

1998]

EXAMINING RELIGIOUS & ETHICAL ISSUES

787

Let me use the case of human identical twins-clones of nature-as a way
into this discussion. The fertilized egg divides, and the result is two individuals
with an identical genetic profile. Two things are important. First, each will be
a distinct individual: Jane will not be Julie, nor Julie Jane. Second, there is no
claim that sharing a genetic identity diminishes in some way the dignity of
either. Each is seen as a person in her own right. And even though many
studies on identical twins have shown that they share many interests and
similarities, even when raised in radically different environments, no one
concludes from this that Jane and Julie are one single person. The fact that the
twins share a genetic identity says nothing about their personal identity, value,
or dignity.
Why should it be different with clones? Or on what basis would it be
different? Without going too deeply into philosophical theories of individuation,
it seems relatively self-evident that though the genetic profile is identical in both
biological twins and clones, they are two different individuals. Minimally, one
is here, and the other is there. Each has a different position from which to see
the world. Each has her relation with the world. Each is a unique individual.
The ethical conclusion I would draw from this is that such individuality is
privileged because it is the manifestation of a personal presence in the world.
The clone, though genetically identical to its progenitor, is nonetheless an
"other" being, a new being, a new presence in the world. To reduce this being
to a means is to violate the clone's personal dignity-and to violate ours as well.
As a thought experiment, suppose that the clone who was bred for replacement
organs objected to having her heart removed. Would such objections be
disregarded? If they are respected, what does this say of the replacement
scenario as a whole? Many discussions of the uses of clones proceed without
any such elemental moral considerations.
2. Reproductive Dimensions
For so many centuries, human reproduction has occurred within a
biological, personal, and familial context, and we have difficulty thinking of it
otherwise. Of course, IVF, in all of its manifestations, has certainly caused us
to rethink that position. But while most are comfortable with the basic concept
of IVF, concerns still remain about aspects of the technical context in which it
is practiced. Some fear that such a context can distance the couple from each
other and from the reproductive process itself. The fear is that reproduction will
become production. While that fear can be alleviated to a large degree by
changes in the context of the practice of IVF, with cloning the correct metaphor
may indeed be production. That is, some fear that, with cloning as the means
of establishing human life, the entire process will become mechanized and
commercialized. One can hardly escape the memory of the "Bokanovsy
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Principle" from Brave New World which allowed the production of "nearly
eleven thousand brothers and sisters in a hundred and fifty batches of identical
twins, all within two years of the same age."' 9 I would argue that humans
produced via cloning are humans as we are, but given the modality of their
production, for how long will we consider them as such? Will this final
sundering of gestation from humans and human bodies ease a transition to
thinking of ourselves as objects, albeit rather sophisticated ones, but objects of
production nonetheless? My argument is not an argument supporting natural
reproduction. Rather, my concern is that the very means by which we produce
ourselves may in fact transform our thinking about ourselves, and the
transformation will be in a mechanistic direction.
Additionally, in such a context, with the laboratory as the locus of
production, we will have the ultimate separation of the child from the family.
To be sure, eggs and sperm will have to be obtained from humans sometime,
but we know from both IVF and surrogate motherhood that eggs, sperm, and
zygotes are indifferent to their origin and destiny. While being sensitive to
correct feminist claims about the patriarchal nature of the family, my question
is this, will we gain or lose by shifting from the family, with all its difficulties,
to a laboratory? Through our genetic identity, we are linked to a family, to a
lineage, to a history, and it is through these concrete biological realities that we
establish at least part of our identity which has an inescapable biological
dimension. If reproduction becomes mechanized through cloning, will we be
put at too great a distance from a community, from a family, and from a basis
for our identity? Such a problem was recognized by the engineers in the movie
Bladerunner who gave their genetically engineered beings a history so they
would not know they were engineered. But of course, that history became the
basis for an identity and an evolution to human status.
3.

Individuality

Having raised the issues of identity, let me conclude with some observations
about genetic uniqueness and individuality. I have previously noted that some
claim that cloning violates individuality or the individual's right to a unique
genetic identity. I argue that it is important to distinguish between genetic
uniqueness and individuality and that the moral priority should be placed on
individuality. While a pre-implantation embryo is genetically unique in that it
is a new combination of the genes from the mother and father, it has not yet
become individualized because restriction has not occurred. Thus, while it
contains the appropriate genetic information for that organism's development,
that genetic information is not morally privileged even though it is genetically

19. ALDOus HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 109 (1946).
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unique. This genetic profile is more correctly described as what is common to
all-what I previously described as our common nature.
Additionally, the developing embryo resulting from this process of
biological individuation is also most appropriately what can philosophically be
called a nature or human nature: the principle of activity by which a being
seeks and actualizes it own fulfillment, or essentially the reason a being acts as
it does. To act according to one's nature is to seek the good of one's nature or,
in our case, to act according to the genetic instructions given the individual
during biological development. At this stage, this is done when the organism
follows the plan given it by its genes and continues its biological development.
One's developmental course is set by one's nature, and this nature is set by
one's genes. And ultimately, as the organism matures, its nature will lead it to
seek a variety of goods for itself; food, shelter, and a desire to protect oneself
are standard examples. To seek. these goods is automatic on our part, an
instinctual part of our nature given to us by our genetic program.
But to act on the basis of one's genetic instructions does not mean to act on
the basis of one's genetic instructions only. We also seem to have a capacity
to transcend our nature through acts in which we seek, for example, the good
of another, or in which we love someone for his or her own sake. This capacity
is the source of true liberty and is a "freedom from nature and a freedom for
values." 2' We move from an act of nature to an act of the person or an act of
the individual through which one freely commits one's self to a good beyond,
but not contrary to, one's own nature. It is the commitment of the self to a
good for the good's own sake. It is the act of love which is so taken by the
good that is loved that the individual wishes this good to be shared by others.
This represents, in my judgment, the supreme moment of the coincidence of
personhood and individualization, for in this act of transcendence of my nature,
I achieve myself in the fullest sense.
This is the act that can be actualized only by myself, and I bear the
responsibility for it. Neither the motivation nor the consequences of a true act
of freedom can be attributed to nor communicated to another. This act describes
the core of personhood. For in so acting, we transcend our own nature and
reach goods that can be experienced with others and that can become the basis
of a community. We do not lose our own moral identity or responsibility;
rather, we find our selves and the grounds of community.

20. Allan B. Wolter, Native Freedom of the Will as a Key to the Ethics of Scotus, in THE
PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY OF DUNS SCOTUS 148, 152 (Marilyn McCord Adams ed., 1990).
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This perspective is helpful in thinking about the relation between genetic
uniqueness and individuality. A genotype, even though unique, may be
multiplied through cloning or may be shared by another through twinning.
Frequently much of the phenotype may be shared as well, but what is not
identical and cannot be shared is individuality. Thus, while twins or clones
may be, for all practical purposes, genetically interchangeable, they are not
individually interchangeable. For in each of these individuals, there has been
a contraction of their common nature to form an individual who can never be
replicated and whose moral acts constitute a unique moral agent. The priority
again is on individuality, not genetic uniqueness.
The poet Gerard Manley Hopkins describes more eloquently this process
of individuation as finding one's pitch, those personal acts of self-transcendence
through which we express our deepest selves. As Hopkins phrases it in the
poem As Kingflshers Catch Fire:
Each mortal thing does one thing and the same:
Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;
Selves-goes its self; myself it speaks and spells,
Crying What I do is me: for that I came. 2
And in doing this, we establish our true individuality. This, I would argue,
is what can never be captured through cloning, for cloning replicates only the
genetic program. It replicates our human nature, but it cannot replicate the
ultimate act of the individual in which he or she both expresses and becomes
one's self.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

Having examined different issues about cloning, what might be said, by
way of concluding comments, regarding public policy? It is clear that not all
would find my arguments persuasive or, even if persuasive, would think they
should not ground public policy on them because of the religious overtones of
many of my arguments. Nonetheless, I think public policy should be proposed,
and I would like to suggest some components. Such considerations are more
critical than ever because of a change in climate so soon after the first successful
cloning. One recent article, On Cloning Humans, 'Never' Turns Swiftly into
'Why Not, '2 has highlight this climate change. The onus of the argument
seems to have shifted from justifying any uses to justifying any prohibitions.
21. Gerard Manley Hopkins, As Kingfishers Catch Fire, in POEMS AND PROSE OF GERARD
MANLEY HOPKINS 51, 51 (W.H. Gardner ed., 1963).
22. Gina Kolata, On Cloning Humans, 'Never' Turns Swiftly into 'Why Not, 'N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
2, 1997, at Al.
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My policy recommendations would, however, focus on justifying uses of
cloning.
First, public policy needs to recognize, and this would be part of its
educational component, that there are three distinct forms of cloning: gene
cloning, cell cloning, and whole organism cloning. The first two types of
cloning are routine in plant and animal genetics and are not the subject of these
public policy proposals. They may be subject to other policies with respect to
safety or environmental impact, but they are not the focus of my comments.
This policy discussion is directed at whole organism human cloning.
Second, public policy must recognize that a critical line has been crossed
with respect to the cloning of a mammal. The significance is that the DNA
from an adult ewe which was previously thought to have been "turned off" has
been reactivated and become the source for a new ewe. This is a dramatic
breakthrough, and while this has been done only once and successfully only after
277 attempts, nonetheless this is a most dramatic breakthrough. There is no
guarantee this procedure will work on other mammals, much less on human
mammals. Nonetheless, that which was previously thought to be impossible has
now been done. The information is public, and the knowledge cannot be
retracted. Therefore, because of its profound consequences, we need to think
carefully about how to use it.
Third, the research must distinguish between attempts to clone humans and
research on human pre-implantation embryos. I have argued in this Article that
some types of cloning research could theoretically be justified on the human preimplantation embryo up to about two weeks after fertilization. The main
justification for this is my argument that until that time, the time of the
biological process of restriction, the human pre-implantation embryo is not yet
individualized. That is, until the process of individuation is completed on a
biological level, we cannot argue that we have a single individual, and being a
single individual is a necessary, though not sufficient, precondition for being a
person. Such research would be conducted on an organism which has a
biological and teleological unity, but is not individualized. Thus, one could
argue that the research is done on human nature, not on a person. Thus, I
would suggest, following my argument above, that some forms of cloning
research could be permitted by this policy.
On the other hand, I would argue that public policy should prohibit attempts
to go beyond this two week period to attempt to clone human individuals. I
have argued that good and valid reasons exist for not permitting the cloning of
humans, the majority of which have already been discussed as reasons why we
might want to clone: having replacement organs or persons, having a
specialized work force, ensuring an endless supply of performers in various
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areas of popular culture, and the interesting possibility of liking oneself so much
that only one of oneself would simply not be enough.
In addition to these arguments, we need to remember that this technology
has had only one success thus far. Therefore, an enormous amount of research
needs to be done on animals to ensure both the efficacy and safety of the
technique. An unanswered question with Dolly, for example, is whether the fact
that the cell from which she was cloned was six years old will make her life
span shorter. Thus, before any serious thought can be given to human
application, the basic cloning technology needs to be established. Prior to the
debate about cloning humans, we need to validate the replicability and safety of
the technology.
Such policy recommendations are general, but they would permit two
critical activities to occur: (1) basic research on gene and cell cloning would not
be interfered with so that research on cloning technologies in animals could
continue; and (2) there would be a moratorium on applications to whole
organism human cloning while the basic technology is being established, giving
us time to engage in a public debate over the wisdom of whole organism human
cloning. While some might find even this minimal policy recommendation a
violation of academic freedom, we should also remember that, as a practical
matter, it would be scientifically and ethically irresponsible to attempt whole
organism human cloning on the basis of one experiment that required 277
attempts before success .was attained. Thus, my policy recommendation is what
any good scientist should say about cloning: we need to do much more basic
research before we even think about human applications.
As we move forward in this debate, I would urge all to recall that common
to many of the reasons supporting cloning are arguments that are crassly
utilitarian and utterly self-serving. These should make us very nervous because
they very clearly reveal-and would perhaps magnify-significant class,
economic, and power differences in our society. Such divisions already cause
enough havoc in our society. Why multiply these through cloning? But when
all is said and done, when all the philosophizing and theologizing is done,
perhaps the best reason against whole organism human cloning comes from the
former Governor of New York, Mario Cuomo, who revealed an extraordinary
amount of wisdom in commenting: "Living with the accumulated knowledge of
all your imperfections, it would be hard to want to reproduce yourself and then
have the arrogance to face the God who will judge you."'

23. Jane Gross, Thinking Twice About Cloning: Jokes Come Easily:
Consequences Soon Follow, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1997, at B3.
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